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CREDITOR PROCESS AGAINST NEGOTIABLE NOTES:
THE CASE FOR A NEW UCC § 3-420
Judgment creditors often must resort to judicial process to en-
force money judgments against recalcitrant debtors.' Difficult
questions arise when the creditor seeks to recover a judgment
against a debtor's property that is in the form of a debt owed to
the debtor evidenced by a negotiable promissory note.2 The follow-
ing hypothetical illustrates the particular problems and policy con-
siderations affecting creditor process against negotiable notes.
Credit Company (Credit Co.) obtains a valid judgment against
David Debtor. Prior to such judgment and in an unrelated
transaction, Debtor received a negotiable promissory note from
Mary Maker for valid consideration. Credit Co. and Maker are
unaware that Debtor intends to negotiate the note to Tom
Transferee for fair consideration. (Transferee is unaware of
Debtor's relationship to Credit Co.) Credit Co. seeks satisfaction
of its judgment against Debtor from Debtor's non-exempt assets,
which are limited to the negotiable note received from Maker.
The conflicting interests of the parties in this illustration expose
the competing policy considerations arising when a creditor seeks
to enforce a judgment against a debtor's negotiable notes. First,
Credit Co., like all creditors, seeks prompt and full payment of all
just debts. Second, Maker, a third party to the debtor-creditor
1. See infra notes 6-31 and accompanying text. This Note will focus solely on postjudg-
ment collection procedures, specifically execution and garnishment. To avoid adding further
complexity to an already confused topic, discussion of provisional or prejudgment remedies
such as attachment has been omitted. The prejudgment and postjudgment policy considera-
tions, however, are quite similar and most of this Note's discussion of policy conflicts also
applies to a discussion of prejudgment remedies. For a discussion of the constitutional issues
raised by prejudgment remedies, see Phillips, Revolution and Counterrevolution: The Su-
preme Court on Creditors' Remedies, 3 FORDHAM URs. L.J. 1 (1974); Scott, Constitutional
Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA.
L. REv. 807 (1975).
2. The courts have recognized this particularly troublesome issue for many years. For ex-
ample, in Bassett v. Garthwaite, 22 Tex. 230 (1859), the court stated: "There are few sub-
jects ... that present to the courts more embarassing questions than the general subject of
the liability of makers of mercantile paper, as garnishees of the payee of such paper." Id. at
233.
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conflict, wishes to avoid harassment; as the maker of the note, she
wants to be free of conflicting claims and potential double liability.
Third, if Transferee purchases Maker's note from Debtor, he ex-
pects assurance that the transaction will be protected, and that he
may further negotiate the note if he desires. Transferee expects
that circumstances unknown to him will not disturb his commer-
cial activity. Moreover, the policies of negotiability require that the
completed transaction be protected so that parties are encouraged
to use commercial paper in buying, selling, and investing.3
This Note will examine the procedures by which a judgment
creditor may satisfy a money judgment from a debt evidenced by a
negotiable note and the policies involved in applying these proce-
dures. The problem is complex and confusing because of diverse
judicial responses to historical changes in the nature and use of
promissory notes. In surveying the various state and analagous
Uniform Commercial Code approaches to the problem, this Note
will identify and discuss important policies of commercial and
debtor-creditor law. Finally, this Note will conclude that statutory
authority permitting the physical seizure of such instruments pro-
vides the proper treatment of creditors' rights against negotiable
notes. The adoption of a new provision in the Uniform Commercial
Code authorizing such treatment of notes would accommodate ef-
fectively the competing policies involved, end the incongruity
within the Uniform Commercial Code, and unify divergent state
approaches to the problem.
JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT
The rendition of a money judgment converts plaintiff and defen-
dant, respectively, to creditor and debtor. When the debtor fails
3. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
4. This Note will focus primarily on negotiable promissory notes. A discussion of three-
party paper, checks, and drafts is omitted. The resolution of the policy conflicts regarding
creditor process against negotiable notes, however, applies generally to other negotiable in-
struments. For a treatment of creditor process of drafts and other forms of commercial pa-
per, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 488.520 (West 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 7-36-3 (Burns 1973).
5. See generally C. NORTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BMLS AND NOTES § 1 (4th ed.
1914); J. OGDEN, LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS §§ 9-24 (4th ed. 1938).
6. Note, Enforcing Money Judgments Against Personal Property in Virginia, 21 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 731, 732 (1980).
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to satisfy this judgment promptly, the creditor may resort to judi-
cial collection processes to enforce the judgment against the
debtor's property. Depending upon the debtor's financial position,
the enforcement of a money judgment may be simple or very
complicated.7
Every state provides post-judgment process, subject to some re-
strictions' and exemptions,9 whereby a creditor may reach the
debtor's real and personal property to enforce a money judgment.
This process generally is known as execution.10 The creditor re-
quests the court to issue a writ of execution, or fieri facias,11 to
reach the debtor's personal property. 2 This writ directs the sheriff
to levy upon property of the debtor specifiect by the creditor. 13
7. One commentator suggests that due to the availability of credit and the ease with
which a consensual lien may be secured on chattels, creditors often have trouble finding
unencumbered personal property from which to collect a money judgment. See Dugan,
Creditors' Postjudgment Remedies (pt. 1), 25 ALA. L. REV. 175, 198 (1972).
8. Some states require creditors to exhaust a debtor's personal estate before reaching any
real property of the debtor. See, e.g., AIz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 12-1553(1) (1982); MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.6004 (1968).
9. All states provide some exemptions from execution for both personalty and realty. The
personal property exemption often is referred to as the "Poor Debtor's" exemption, see, e.g.,
VA. CODE § 34-26 (Supp. 1982). The real property exemption commonly is referred to as the
"Homestead Exemption," see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-301 (1980); MONT. CODE ANN. §
70-32-201 (1982). Typically, exempt personal property includes wearing apparel, kitchen
utensils, family bibles, farm animals, and tools of one's trade. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
513.430-.435 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1982); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5205 (McKinney 1978 &
Supp. 1982). Generally, state legislatures believe that the exempt property constitutes the
necessities of life. See generally Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEo. L.J. 779,
785-88 (1974) (discussing policies underlying exemption statutes).
10. Stated generally, execution "is process authorizing the seizure and appropriation of
the property of a defendant for the satisfaction of a judgment against him." Lambert v.
Powers, 36 Iowa 18, 20 .(1872). See generally S. RiESENFED, CREDrroas' REMEIms AND
DEBTORS' PROTECTION 2-176 (3rd ed. 1979).
11. The modem trend is to use the term "writ of execution," although some states still
use the latin term "writ of fieri facias." See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2311 (Purdon
1967); VA. CODE § 8.01-474 (1977). For a discussion of other common law writs once availa-
ble to creditors, see Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law - A
Historical Inventory and Prospectus, 42 IowA L. Rnv. 155 (1957); Note, supra note 6, at
733.
12. Creditors may reach real property also, usually by execution, although the proper pro-
cess varies in some states. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-462 (1977) (judgment lien is enforced
by creditor's bill in equity in Virginia). Process against real property is subject to restric-
tions and exemptions. The "Homestead Exemption" typically exempts a certain dollar
amount of a debtor's equity in real estate. See generally supra note 6.
13. To help prevent a return nulla bona (literally, no goods) because of the sheriff's reluc-
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Normally, the sheriff performs the levy by seizure, the taking of
the debtor's property into the sheriff's possession. 14 At the time of
levy, the creditor obtains a lien on the levied property."5 The
debtor's property then is sold at public auction or execution sale,
and the proceeds are used to satisfy the creditor's judgment, with
any residue being returned to the debtor.'
If the debtor's property is in the possession of a third party or
consists of a debt owed to the debtor by a third party, the creditor
may reach such property through a writ of garnishment. 7 In a gar-
nishment proceeding, the creditor files an affidavit asserting that
the third party holds property of the debtor. The court then issues
a writ of garnishment directing the third party (garnishee) to de-
liver the property or to pay the debt into the court or to the credi-
tor (garnishor).' s The garnishee may respond to the writ by stating
tance to seize the debtor's property, the creditor should specify for the sheriff the property
to be levied upon. Some states provide statutory authority allowing judgment creditors to
make such specifications. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 77, § 11 (Smith-Hurd 1966). Other
states, however, permit the debtor to select the property against which the sheriff will levy.
See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1562(b) (1982).
14. In most states, some form of "constructive possession" constitutes a valid levy if the
property is of a size or quality not easily reduced to manual possession. See CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE §§ 488.360c to .688 (West 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 550.13 to .17 (1947 & 1982
Supp.); Crisman v. Dorsey, 12 Colo. 567, 21 P. 920 (1889); Johnson v. Walker, 23 Neb. 736,
37 N.W. 639 (1888) (constructive possession does not constitute effective levy if actual
seizure is possible).
15. Some states date a creditor's lien from the time the writ of execution is delivered to
the sheriff. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-116 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 15-307 (1981); W.
VA. CODE § 38-4-8 (1966). Apparently, a lien created by delivery of the writ is an inchoate
lien which becomes a specific and perfected lien only upon levy. See S. RiESENFELD, supra
note 10, at 161 n.3. Tennessee continues to date a creditor's execution lien on debtor's chat-
tels from teste, the date of issuance of the writ. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-1-109 (1980).
Finally, in three states, a valid judgment creates a judgment lien (as opposed to an execu-
tion lien) upon the debtor's chattels at the time the judgment is entered or recorded. See
ALA. CODE § 6-9-211 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-80 (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-191
(1972).
In most jurisdictions, no lien on intangibles of the debtor is created until notice of levy or
a garnishment summons is served on the judgment debtor's debtor, although a few states
date a lien on intangibles from delivery of the writ to the sheriff. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-
501 (1977). See generally S. RIESENFELD, supra note 10, at 160-61, 221-22.
16. See, e.g., MiCH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.6004 (1968).
17. Garnishment commonly is referred to as "trustee process" in the New England
states, except in Connecticut where garnishment is called "foreign attachment." See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-329 (Supp. 1982). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 246, § 1 (Supp.
1982). See generally S. RIESENFELD, supra note 10, at 253-61.
18. Absent a statute to the contrary, the principal debtor (judgment creditor's debtor) is
506
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that the property or debt does not exist and thus avoid an adverse
judgment in garnishment. If the third party does not make such a
response, then the creditor obtains a lien on the property in the
garnishee's possession 19 dating from the time the garnishee is sum-
moned. 20 The creditor realizes on the lien by receiving payment
from the third party of the debt owed to the debtor, or from the
proceeds of a sale of the property belonging to the debtor.21
States also provide creditors with mechanisms for dealing with
particularly uncooperative debtors. Through the use of supplemen-
tal proceedings, 2 2 the creditor may examine the debtor to discover
the location of hidden assets.23 Supplemental proceedings vary
among states but often include: the issuance of injunctions to pre-
vent the debtor from transferring property out of his possession;24
not a party to the garnishment proceeding, unless he intervenes or is interpleaded. S. Rm-
SENFELD, supra note 10, at 244 n.1. In Virginia, although supplementary to and in aid of
execution, garnishment is an independent civil action rather than a summary process. See
Note, supra note 6, at 797.
19. A court will not order a garnishee to make payments when the garnishee denies the
indebtedness. Moreover, a garnishee is discharged if he answers under oath in an affadavit
that he is not indebted to the garnishing creditor's debtor. See, e.g., AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
12-1581(A) (1982). States, however, provide creditors with remedies against garnishees who
wrongfully conceal assets. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-455, -456 (1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-721 (1976).
20. See supra note 15.
21. See S. RmSENFELD, supra note 10, at 253-61.
22. Supplemental proceedings involve in personam orders, whereas the enforcement of
money judgments usually proceeds in rem. Because these procedures involve in personam
orders, they are considered extraordinary relief and thus are granted only when a creditor's
remedies at law are inadequate. This Note does not discuss supplemental proceedings at
length. Although these proceedings are available to creditors, they are disfavored generally
because they are equitable in nature. Equitable remedies deprive the defendant debtor of a
jury trial. Additionally, the in personam orders involved in supplemental proceedings chal-
lenge the court's integrity because they are enforced through the court's contempt power.
Therefore, unless the legal alternatives of execution and garnishment will not satisfy the
judgment, resort should not be made to supplemental proceedings. Use of one such proceed-
ing, debtor's interrogatories, to discover assets cannot be avoided if the creditor is unfamil-
iar with the debtor. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMsS §§ 2.5, .6, .8, .9
(1973); Cook, Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 COLUM. L. REv. 37-54, 106-41, 228-52 (1915);
Rendleman, Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REv.
346 (1981).
23. In Virginia, this supplemental proceeding is called interrogatory procedure. VA. CODE
§ 8.01-506 (1977). See also Note, supra note 6, at 768-70.
24. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-341 (West 1960); MICH. CT. RuLEs 738.4(3)
(West 1981).
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the assignment of debtor's rights to the creditor; 5 the appointment
of receivers;26 and the sequestration or sale of the debtor's
property.17
The law of fraudulent conveyances affords further protection to
creditors by preventing debtors from frustrating execution proce-
dures by concealing assets or by transferring property to third par-
ties, often relatives or friends. The law of fraudulent conveyances
exists in some form in every jurisdiction,28 and profoundly affects
the rights of debtors, creditors, and transferees. 29 The law of fraud-
ulent conveyances, however, will not upset a transfer to a third
party when the transferee pays fair consideration without knowl-
edge of the debtor's attempt to frustrate the collection process.3 0
This brief introduction to the post-judgment creditor process
reveals the complexity of the problem posed by the above hypo-
thetical, in which a creditor seeks to satisfy his judgment from a
debt owing to the debtor in the form of negotiable note. Several
challenging legal questions are raised, including: how a judgment
creditor may reach a debt in negotiable form owed to a judgment
debtor; whether a judgment creditor may physically seize and sell
the note, or whether the creditor must resort to garnishing the
maker; and whether the judgment creditor may void a transfer by
the judgment debtor to a third-party transferee as fraudulent. The
treatment afforded a creditor seeking to satisfy a money judgment
from a debt evidenced by a negotiable promissory note varies
25. See, e.g., VA. CoDE § 8.01-507 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 1-33-101 (1977).
27. See Kieffer v. Ehler, 18 Pa. 388 (1852).
28. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act permits creditors to upset conveyances
made without fair consideration by persons who are insolvent at the time of conveyance,
who become insolvent or undercapitalized because of the conveyance, or intend to defraud
creditors. UmN. FRAUD. CoNVEY. AcT §§ 4-7 (1918). Under the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act and in most jurisdictions, a creditor has two basic choices: he may have the con-
veyance set aside and then proceed to levy and sale, or he may have a levy and sale in
disregard of the conveyance and leave it to the purchaser to assert his title by means of an
action for ejectment or quiet title in the case of realty, or by means of an action in replevin
in the case of chattels. S. RIESENFELD, supra note 10, at 387 n.2.
29. A good faith transferee of debtor's property is protected if the transferee has paid fair
consideration. In such a case, the conveyance is not upset as fraudulent because the debtor's
balance sheet is unaffected when transferee pays fair consideration. See UNIF. FRAUD. CON-
vEa. AcT § 3.
30. See UNw. FRAUD. CoNVEY. AcT 8§ 3, 7; U.C.C. §§ 3-302, -305.
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greatly from state to state, with various states placing a different
emphasis on protecting the divergent interests involved.
DEVELOPMENT OF CREDITOR'S RIGHTS AGAINST COMMERCIAL PAPER
Execution at Common Law
At common law, a creditor could perfect a levy pursuant to a
writ of fieri facias only if the sheriff physically seized the debtor's
property."' Intangible property, such as equitable interests and
choses in action, could not be subjected to execution because they
lacked a physical existence3 2 and thus were incapable of manual
delivery.33 Consequently, notes, which are choses in action, could
not be seized at common law and were regarded by courts as im-
mune from execution. 4
The common law approach is circular in its reasoning because it
ignores the commercial and practical realities underlying the use of
negotiable notes. Notes themselves are tangible and capable of
manual delivery in that they are "perceptible to the touch."3 5 As
early as 1818, an English court stated that a negotiable chose in
action was not intangible property, but constituted a chattel bound
up in a negotiable instrument.8
Despite the early English characterization of a note as tangible
property, most states enacted execution and enforcement of money
judgment provisions that codified common law conceptions of
notes as intangible property not subject to seizure. 7 Moreover,
statutes that conffict with this common law notion have been con-
31. See, e.g., Ex rel. Mather v. Carnes, 551 S.W.2d 272, 282 (Mo. App. 1977).
32. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Hyatt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 294 (1889) (equitable interest of re-
demption); Acme Harvesting Machine Co. v. Hinkley, 23 S.D. 509, 122 N.W. 482 (1909)
(judgment is a chose in action).
33. See, e.g., McBride v. Fallon, 65 Cal. 301, 4 P. 17 (1884).
34. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., H.D., & J.K. Crosswell Inc. v. Jones, 52 F. Supp. 880, 883 (E.D.S.C. 1931),
rev'd on other grounds, 60 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1932); Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684,
686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). See generally BLACK'S LAW DIcToNARY 726, 1305-06 (rev. 5th ed.
1979) (defining "intangible property," "tangible," and "tangible property").
36. See M'Neilage v. Holloway, 1 B. & Ad. 218, 106 Eng. Rep. 80 (1818).
37. See, e.g., MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235, § 31 (West 1959): "All property which by
common law is liable to be taken on execution, may be taken and sold thereon, except as
otherwise expressly provided." See also UTAH R. CIv. P. 64C(e)(3) (1953).
19831
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strued narrowly.38 The common law approach to the levying on
and seizure of negotiable promissory notes still prevails when the
execution statutes are silent on the nature of these notes.39 A ma-
jority of jurisdictions follow the common law'0 through express
statutory enactments, judicial precedent,41 or an absence of any
contrary law.2
38. See, e.g., John Julian Constr. Co. v. Monarch Builders, Inc., 306 A.2d 29 (Del. Super.
1973), aff'd, 324 A.2d 208 (Del. 1974).
39. See infra note 42.
40. See infra notes 41 & 42.
41. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 6-9-40(2) (1977); Peavy Lumber Co. v. Murchison, 272 Ala. 251,
130 So. 2d 338 (1961); Lowremore v. Barry, 19 Ala. 130 (1851). See also Cottingham v.
Greely-Barham Grocery Co., 137 Ala. 149, 34 So. 956 (1903).
Arizona: Cagle v. Butcher, 118 Ariz. 122, 575 P.2d 321 (1978); Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. 561,
84 P.2d 575 (1938). But see Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1558(B), -1559(2) (1982).
Arkansas: Field v. Lawson, 5 Ark. 376 (1842).
Connecticut- Grosvenor v. Farmers and Mechanics Bank, 13 Conn. 104 (1839); Fitch v.
Waite, 5 Conn. 117 (1823).
Florida: General Guaranty Ins. Co. v. DaCosta, 190 So. 2d 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
Harris v. Smith, 7 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1942).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 9-13-57 (1982); Kilgore v. Buice, 229 Ga. 445, 192 S.E.2d 256
(1972); Harvey v. Wright, 80 Ga. App. 232, 55 S.E.2d 835 (1949).
Illinois: Crawford v. Schmitz, 139 Ill. App. 564, 29 N.E. 40 (1891).
Maine: Smith v. Kennebec & P.R. Co., 45 Me. 547 (1858).
Maryland: Cf. Harford Bank of Bel Air v. Harve de Grace Banking & Trust Co., 165 Md.
454, 169 A. 315 (1933) (choses in action not subject to execution).
Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 235, § 31 (West 1959); Jordan v. Lavin, 319
Mass. 362, 66 N.E.2d 41 (1946); Perry v. Coates, 9 Mass. 537 (1813); Marine Fire and
Marine Ins. Co. v. Weeks, 7 Mass. 438 (1811).
Michigan: Jenson v. Ocean& Circuit Judge, 194 Mich. 405, 160 N.W. 620 (1916).
New Hampshire: N.H.I.F. Co. v. Platt, 5 N.H. 193 (1830); Spencer v. Blaisdell, 4 N.H. 198
(1827).
Pennsylvania: Rhoads v. Megonigal, 2 Pa. 39 (1845). But see PA. R. Crv. P. 3108, 3109
(1982); Brennan v. Pittston Brewing Corp., 344 Pa. 495, 26 A.2d 334 (1942).
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-26-4(11) (Supp. 1982); Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Clarke, 29
R.I. 192, 69 A. 681 (1908).
Tennessee: Moore v. Pillow, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 448 (1842).
Texas: Price v. Brady, 21 Tex. 614 (1858).
Utah: UTAH R. Civ. P. 64C(e)(3), (6) (1953).
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2731, 2740 (1973); Morse v. Stevens, 95 Vt. 465, 115 A.
697 (1922).
42. The following states appear to lack any statute or precedent changing the common
law approach to creditor process of negotiable notes: Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii (see Ferry v.
Murata, 26 Haw. 699 (1923) (choses in action not subject to execution)), Kansas, Maryland
(see Harford Bank of Bel Air v. Harve de Grace Banking & Trust Co., 165 Md. 454, 169 A.
315 (1933) (choses in action not subject to execution)), Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming.
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Garnishment
As courts of equity began to recognize the transfer of contract
rights and other intangibles, and as these legal interests became
sources of wealth, creditors, dissatisfied with the strict and circular
common law approach,43 demanded access to these intangibles." In
states following the common law approach to execution against
notes,45 statutory garnishment became the means by which a credi-
tor could reach commercially valuable yet intangible assets, includ-
ing debts evidenced by notes. 6 Pursuant to a writ of garnishment,
a court orders the judgment debtor's debtor (the garnishee) to pay
the debt owed to the judgment debtor into the court or to the
judgment creditor (the garnishor) directly.47
Levy by Notice
While some states employed garnishment statutes to afford cred-
itors access to intangible property owned by judgment debtors,48
other states alleviated the creditor's burden under the restrictive
common law rules by adopting a new form of levy.49 Unlike the
common law, under which levy occurred only upon physical seizure
of the property, tl~ese states authorized levy by notice alone for
assets incapable of manual delivery.50
43. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
44. See S. RIESENFELD, supra note 10, at 215-18.
45. See Riesenfeld, supra note 11, at 155; Riesenfeld, Enforcement of Money Judgments
in Early American History, 71 MICH. L. REv. 691 (1973).
46. Many courts stated that garnishment was the proper way to reach a debtor's asset in
the form of a debt evidenced by a note. See, e.g., Cagle v. Butcher, 118 Ariz. 122, 575 P.2d
321 (1978).
47. For a discussion of garnishment generally, see supra notes 17-21 and accompanying
text.
48. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1559(2) (Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 8-506(5)
(1979). Typically, "levy" means seizure, and some statutes provide that "'levy'... shall be
construed to mean the actual seizure of property by the officer charged with the execution of
the writ." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.010 (Vernon 1949). Levy by notice may be available in
addition to garnishment in some states. See S. RIESENFELD, supra note 10, at 217 nn.10 &
11. Levy by notice originally developed to give creditors access to corporate stock held by
debtors. See Annot., 1 A.L.R. 653 (1919).
50. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1559(2) (1982). But see Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz.
561, 84 P.2d 575 (1938). Cf. IDAHO CODE §§ 8-506(5), 11-201 (1979); KA. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-
706, -2401(e) (1976); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-18-405 (1979); VA. CODE § 8.01-501 (1977).
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In states allowing levy by notice, a creditor may levy against a
promissory note by having notice served on the party indebted to
the judgment debtor, for example, the maker of the note. The pro-
cess is essentially equivalent to garnishment,5' but does not require
the sheriff to seize the note from the debtor.52 Levy by notice also
differs from garnishment in that the former provides creditors ac-
cess to the debtor's valuable but intangible assets through the ex-
isting execution process by extending the writ of fieri facias to
reach intangibles such as promissory notes, whereas garnishment
provides a procedure supplemental to or in aid of execution.5"
Protecting Negotiability
Garnishment and levy provide some relief to creditors frustrated
by common law constraints on execution. Although these procedu-
ral innovations promote the policy of allowing creditors to collect
just debts, they conflict with the concomitant policies underlying
the law of negotiable instruments. 4
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,55 now superseded by
the Uniform Commercial Code, codified a significant body of case
law establishing negotiability as inherently valuable to commercial
transactions.58 The primary purpose underlying the development
of the law of negotiable instruments was to promote the efficient
(statutes construable as levy by notice statutes).
51. See generally S. RIESENFELD, supra note 10, at 229-78; J. ROOD, LAW OF GARNISHMENT
(1896).
52. Typically, when debtor's property is in the hands of a third party, the sheriff will seize
the property or order it delivered to the court. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying
text.
53. See generally S. RESENFELD, supra note 10, at 229-78.
54. If a promissory note is not negotiable, the policy conflicts exposed by the introductory
hypothetical do not exist. A transferee of a non-negotiable note takes the note subject to all
prior attachment and execution Hens; therefore, a creditor's remedy against a non-negotia-
ble note could not be defeated by a transfer to an innocent transferee. See Heimes v.
Heines, 24 N.W.2d 335 (S.D. 1946). Moreover, a transferee must take a negotiable instru-
ment to be a holder in due course. U.C.C. § 3-302. Thus, creditors seeking satisfaction of a
negotiable note must contend with the policies of negotiability. See infra note 58 and ac-
companying text. For a pre-U.C.C. discussion of negotiability and creditors' rights, see 30
MINN. L. REV. 616 (1945).
55. The text of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law is reproduced in J. OGDEN,
supra note 4. See U.C.C. § 3-101, Draftsmen's Comment.
56. See 1 T. PARSONS, LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE 274-80 (1863);
S. WILLISTON, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-15 (1931).
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exchange of resources in the market.57 Several policies promote
this goal, including protecting the integrity of the marketplace and
inducing parties to rely on commercial paper, such as negotiable
notes, in buying, selling, and investing.58 Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code sets forth specific rules defining the elements of
negotiability. 59 Additionally, article 3 provides rules for the trans-
fer of negotiable instrumentse0 and protects certain parties who
take these instruments."' The rules facilitate commerce by increas-
ing certainty in the use of commercial paper.
The statutory authority allowing a transferee to take a negotia-
ble note free of claims and most defenses of prior holders is essen-
tial in furthering the policies of negotiability. Thus, article 3 sets
out the holder in due course doctrine which protects transferees
taking negotiable notes in good faith, for value, and without notice
of deficiencies in the instrument.6 2 The long-standing protection of
transferees meeting these requirements has been critical in encour-
aging the expanded use of commercial paper.6 3
In addition to enforcing the instrument in his own name, a
holder in due course also may further negotiate the instrument and
pass to the transferee the protections accorded a holder in due
course. 6' The ability to take an instrument free of other claims,
therefore, is a central policy of negotiability.
The policies of negotiability, however, create significant conflicts
in states following common law execution, garnishment, or levy by
57. Peacock v. Rhodes, 2 Doug. 633, 99 Eng. Rep. 402 (K.B. 1781); Price v. Neal, 3 Burr.
1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762); Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B.
1758).
58. To encourage commerce by permitting negotiable instruments to circulate as if they
were money, courts generally protect good faith purchasers and transferees who pay valid
consideration. See generally Gilmore, Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63
YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
59. U.C.C. §§ 3-104 to -118.
60. Id. § 3-202.
61. Id. §§ 3-305, -306.
62. The Uniform Commercial Code defines a holder in due course as a holder who takes
the instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice that it is overdue or has been
dishonored or of any defense against or claim by any person. U.C.C. § 3-302(1). See gener-
ally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMCEAL
CODE §§ 14-1 to -10 (1980).
63. See, e.g., W. OPPENHEIMER, SELOVER ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMNTs § 169 (2d ed. 1912)
(cases cited).
64. U.C.C. §§ 3-201, -301.
1983] 513
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
notice of negotiable notes. In particular, these approaches to credi-
tor process of notes potentially expose makers of negotiable notes
to multiple liability. The problem of liability for double payment
on a note is illustrated in Knisely v. Evans. 5 In Knisely, the
maker of the note originally made the note payable to Arnold, the
payee.66 Arnold subsequently negotiated the note to Evans, the
transferee.6 7 Following this transfer, Arnold became indebted to
Hummel & Bros., the creditor.6 8 In a separate action against Ar-
nold, Hummel & Bros. served Knisely, the maker of the note, with
a writ of garnishment, believing that he was indebted to Arnold.69
Unaware of the transfer of the note from Arnold to Evans, Knisely
acknowledged his indebtedness to Arnold.70 The court ordered
Knisely to pay into court an amount on the indebtedness that
would satisfy Hummel & Bros.' claim against Arnold, and Knisely
complied.7 1
Following this garnishment suit, Evans, the transferee of the
note, initiated a suit against Knisely, the maker, to collect on the
note. The trial court credited Knisely with the amount paid to
Hummel & Bros. in garnishment in the prior action. 2 On appeal,
however, the appellate court reversed and held Knisely liable for
the entire amount of the note.73 The Supreme Court of Ohio af-
firmed this determination, stating that the maker's error as to
whom he was indebted would not prejudice the transferee's
rights. 4 After the transfer from Arnold to Evans and at the time of
garnishment, Evans, and not Arnold, was the payee of the note.
Therefore "payment by Knisely to Hummel & Bros. would have
constituted no defense to an action instituted on the note by the
65. 34 Ohio St. 158 (1877). For other cases recognizing the maker's dilemma, see Stone v.
Dean, 5 N.H. 502 (1831); Willis v. Heath, 75 Tex. 124 (1889); Gunn v. Manthov, 138 Wash.
96, 244 P. 133 (1926). See generally C. DRA, SumTs BY ATTACHMENT §§ 233-234 (1885).
66. 34 Ohio St. at 158.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 160.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 161-62.
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payee himself."" Knisely was liable to Evans for the full amount
of the note and, therefore, was required to pay twice: once in gar-
nishment and once on the note.
The decision in Knisely demonstrates that, prior to the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform Commercial Code,
courts protected the rights of good faith purchasers of commercial
paper.7e More importantly, Knisely illustrates that the problem
raised by the introductory hypothetical poses more than a mere
academic exercise. A recent decision under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code illustrates that this problem of reconciling the competing
policies of protecting creditors and negotiability persists.
In Bricks Unlimited, Inc. v. Agee,7 a judgment creditor gar-
nished a debt evidenced by a negotiable note payable to and in the
possession of the judgment debtor.78 In response to the writ of gar-
nishment, the maker of the note admitted his indebtedness. 9 Fol-
lowing the garnishment but before the note became due, the judg-
ment debtor pledged the note to a bank as collateral for a loan.80
After the note reached maturity, both the garnishing creditor and
the bank claimed interests in the note and its proceeds.81 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Missis-
sippi held that the pledgee bank, as a holder in due course, took
priority over the judgment creditor.82 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.8 3 Thus, despite prudent ac-
tion by the judgment creditor, his collection efforts were
frustrated.
The decision in Bricks Unlimited also illustrates the harassment
and potential double liability to which makers of negotiable notes
are exposed in a majority of jurisdictions.84 If the maker of the
75. Id. at 163.
76. See supra note 56. For the text of and commentary on the Uniform Negotiable In-
struments Law, see W. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 63.
77. 672 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 1257.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1257-58.
82. Id. at 1259.
83. Id. at 1260.
84. A maker may be exposed to double liability when the applicable state continues to
follow common law execution rules, see supra notes 41 & 42, and has no protective statute,
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note in Bricks Unlimited did not know that the debtor had pledg-
ed the note as security, she would have paid the judgment creditor
pursuant to a judgment against her in garnishment. Notwithstand-
ing this payment, she would have been subjected to a second obli-
gation to pay on the note when the bank, as a holder in due course,
sought satisfaction of its claim on the note."" Knisely and Bricks
Unlimited thus demonstrate the need for procedures that better
accomodate creditors' need to satisfy judgments while protecting
negotiability and treating fairly makers of negotiable notes.
Makers Excepted from Garnishee Liability
Recognizing the dilemma illustrated by Knisely and Bricks Un-
limited, many states concluded that the maker of a negotiable note
"cannot be charged as garnishee of the payee except upon a show-
ing which will clearly protect him against the holder.""6 This prin-
ciple attempts to accommodate the competing interests in protect-
ing negotiability and permitting creditors to collect just debts
while preventing the undue harassment of third parties.
To understand the maker's situation, a distinction must be made
between garnishing a note before it is due and garnishing a note
that is overdue. Presumably, garnishment of a negotiable note af-
ter it is due is permitted because usually such a note may not be
taken by a holder in due course.8 7 If the subsequent transferee or
holder has notice that the note is overdue, he will not qualify as a
holder in due course.8 8 A maker will not be liable to a subsequent
see infra note 104, or has a protective statute that inadequately protects makers, see infra
note 91.
85. See U.C.C. § 3-305.
86. West v. Baker, 109 Ariz. 415, 417, 510 P.2d 731, 733 (1973). The Uniform Commercial
Code protects makers from excessive liability on a note by providing them with a discharge
on the instrument when they pay a holder. Moreover, makers need not make payments for
having made an instrument unless they receive a discharge or are indemnified and payment
is enjoined. See U.C.C. § 3-603. Garnishment rules, however, do not incorporate § 3-603.
Typically, when a maker pays pursuant to a garnishment summons, he is not paying a
holder and therefore, he will not be discharged on the note. Thus, a maker of a negotiable
note always should check to see who is in possession of the note. If anyone other than the
original payee is in possession, the maker should refuse to pay on the note in garnishment.
87. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
88. Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 3-302 makes clear that the mere fact that an instrument is
overdue will not prevent the taker from being a holder in due course unless he has notice
that the instrument is overdue. Section 3-304(3) defines when a purchaser will have notice
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holder who is not a holder in due course if the maker has paid
pursuant to a writ of garnishment.89 A maker can defeat a trans-
feree who took after maturity in a suit on the note by setting up
payment in garnishment as a defense.90 Thus, the maker is pro-
tected from double liability.
To protect the maker/garnishee from double liability on notes
transferred before they were due, many states formulated a rule
prohibiting garnishment of a note before it became due.91 Courts
that an instrument is overdue.
89. For a discussion of garnishment process generally, see supra notes 17-21 and accom-
panying text.
90. A holder who is not a holder in due course takes an instrument subject to all defenses
of the maker. See U.C.C. § 3-306(b); Security Pacific Natl Bank v. Chess, 58 Cal. App. 3d
555, 129 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1976). Pre-U.C.C. cases are consistent with § 3-306(b). See, e.g.,
Culver v. Parish, 21 Conn. 408 (1851) (transferee who took after maturity took subject to all
other prior interests in the note, specifically the judgment creditor's lien perfected by notic-
ing the debtor/holder). If such a note is taken by a holder in due course, the policies of
negotiability require that the completed transaction and the transferee's interests be pro-
tected. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMnMERs, supra note 62, §§ 14-1 to -10. See also Wood v.
Bodwell, 29 Mass. (12 Pick. 268) 272 (1831); Lanese v. Duff, 24 Ohio App. 494, 156 N.E. 461
(1927); Kimbrough v. Hornsby, 113 Tenn. 605, 84 S.W. 613 (1905).
91. Arizona: ARz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 12-1571(A)(1)(b) (1982); West v. Baker, 109 Ariz.
415, 510 P.2d 731 (1973).
Arkansas: W.A. Smith & Bro. v. Spinnenweber & Peters, 114 Ark. 384, 170 S.W. 84 (1914)
(note must be overdue and in hands of original payee).
Colorado: COLO. R. Civ. PRo. 103(q) (1973); Citizens Bank v. First National Bank, 66
Colo. 426, 182 P. 12 (1919). But see COLO. R. Civ. PRO. 103 (Supp. 1982) (deletion of subsec-
tion (q)).
Florida: Hollopeter & Post, Inc. v. Saenz, 133 Fla. 279, 182 So. 906 (1938); Huot, Kelly &
Co. v. Ely, Candee & Wilder, 17 Fla. 775 (1880) (maker protected from garnishee liability
unless maker gains possession of the note).
Georgia: Mims v. West, 38 Ga. 18 (1868).
Hawaii: HAwAu REv. STAT. § 652-10 (1976).
Idaho: Everson v. Atlas Tire Co., 73 Idaho 91, 245 P.2d 773 (1952).
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 62, § 41 (1972); National Bank of Austin v. First Wisc. Bank
of Milwaukee, 48 IMI. App. 3d 915, 363 N.E.2d 619 (1977); Wright v. McCarty, 92 IMI. App.
120 (1901).
Iowa: Yocum & Rob v. White, 36 Iowa 288 (1873); Hughes v. Monty, 24 Iowa 499 (1868);
Commissioners of Jefferson County v. Fox, 1 Iowa (Morris 48) 65 (1840).
Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 246, § 32(1) (West Supp. 1982). But see Clark-
Wilcox Co. v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 314 Mass. 402, 50 N.E.2d 53 (1943).
Michigan: MICH. CT. RULEs 738.5(5) (West 1981).
Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-35-35 (1972).
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 525.030(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982). See also Weil v. Tyler, 38
Mo. 558 (1866).
Nebraska: Fisher v. O'Hanlon, 93 Neb. 529, 141 N.W. 157 (1913).
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reasoned that because the debtor, as the original holder and payee,
had no rights against the maker until the note became due, a gar-
nishing creditor also had no rights against the maker until that
time.2 Additionally, courts stated that once the debtor transferred
the note, the creditor had no recourse against the maker because
the maker's obligation on the note ran to a party other than the
creditor's debtor.93 Most courts and legislatures thus viewed the
maker as protected under the rule preventing garnishment while
the note is still current.9 4
The fallacy in this approach to the debtor's dilemma is that the
maker of the note is not adequately protected when the original
payee of the note transfers the note before it is due to a third
party without the maker's knowledge.9 5 When the maker is una-
ware of any transfer of the note, he will answer affirmatively to a
post-maturity writ of garnishment if the transferee has not yet de-
manded payment on the note. This unsuspecting compliance re-
sults in an order to pay the garnishing creditor.9 ' The maker
Nevada: NEV. REv. STAT. § 31.390 (1979).
Ohio: Lanese v. Duff, 24 Ohio App. 494, 156 N.E. 461 (1927). But see Secor v. Witter, 39
Ohio St. 218 (1883) (absolute exception for makers from garnishee liability).
Pennsylvania: Joseph Melnick Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Melnick, 318 Pa. 120, 178 A. 144
(1935).
Texas: Bassett v. Garthwaite, 22 Tex. 230 (1858); Inglehart v. Moore, 21 Tex. 501 (1858).
But see Neal v. Kurz, 26 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (absolute exception for makers
from garnishee liability).
Utah: UTAH R. Civ. P. 64D(o) (1977).
Virginia: See Note, supra note 6, at 839.
Washington: Gunn v. Manthov, 138 Wash. 96, 244 P. 133 (1926) (unmature debts evi-
denced by promissory notes may be garnished only if the note is impounded). See generally
C. DRAKE, supra note 65, at § 580 (1885); ROOD, supra note 51.
92. See, e.g., Edney v. Willis, 23 Neb. 56, 36 N.W. 300 (1888); Bassett v. Garthwaite, 22
Tex. 230 (1858).
93. See Inglehart v. Moore, 21 Tex. 501 (1858).
94. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 62, § 41 (Smith-Hurd 1972); Inglehart v. Moore, 21 Tex.
501 (1858).
95. Knisely v. Evans, 34 Ohio St. 158 (1877), illustrates the problem well. For a discussion
of the case, see supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
Where the maker is aware of a pre-maturity transfer, he will deny any indebtedness to the
creditor's debtor. This denial will discharge the maker from any garnishee liability. See, e.g.,
Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1581(A) (1982). Alternatively, the maker may choose to use an
interpleader procedure. See, e.g., Miss. CoDE ANN. § 11-35-41 (1972). See also Bricks Unlim-
ited, Inc. v. Agee, 672 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1982), supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
1983] CREDITOR PROCESS AGAINST NEGOTIABLE NOTES
thereby risks being required to pay twice. The transferee/holder of
the note must be paid because he took before the note became
overdue.9 7 If the transferee also takes in good faith, for value, and
without notice of the garnishment, he will be a holder in due
course and not subject to the maker's defense of prior payment in
garnishment. 98
Some state legislatures and courts have modified the rule per-
mitting garnishment of a debt evidenced by a note once the note
becomes due because of the potential hardship resulting from
transfers unknown to the maker. A few jurisdictions hold that the
maker of a negotiable note will not be charged as a garnishee un-
less the note is in the maker's possession and control.9 Other
courts require the garnishing creditor to make an affirmative show-
ing that the note remains in the original payee's (principal
debtor's) possession. 100 Other statutory approaches include requir-
ing the original payee to notify the maker of any transfer,101 man-
dating delivery of the note to the maker or the court prior to gar-
nishment,10 2 and enjoining any negotiation of the note. 0 3
Some jurisdictions resolve the maker's dilemma by excepting all
makers from liability as garnishees for having drawn or made a
note. 04 Although this final approach clearly protects the maker's
97. Lanese v. Duff, 24 Ohio App. 494, 156 N.E. 461 (1927); Kimbrough v. Hornsby, 113
Tenn. 605, 64 S.W. 613 (1905).
98. See U.C.C. § 3-305(2). This problem is particularly acute when creditors are permit-
ted to initiate garnishment procedures before the note is due and judgment against the
maker/garnishee is suspended until the note reaches maturity. See supra notes 77-85 and
accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Huot, Kelly & Co. v. Ely, Candee & Wilder, 17 Fla. 775, 782 (1880).
100. See, e.g., Thompson v. Gainsville Nat'l Bank, 66 Tex. 156, 18 S.W. 350 (1886).
101. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4155 (1980).
102. See, e.g., Great W. Fin. Co. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 76 Colo. 48, 230 P. 115 (1924);
Kieffer v. Ehler, 18 Pa. 388 (1852).
103. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-341 (1960); MICH. CT. RuLEs 738.4(3) (West
1981); PA. RULEs OF CT. 3118(a)(1) (West 1982).
104. Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-724(1) (1976).
Maine: Ms. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2602(1) (1980).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.43 (1947).
New Hampshire: Stone v. Dean, 5 N.H. 502 (1831). But see N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 512:22
(1968).
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-09-29(1) (1976). But see id. § 32-09.1-15 (Supp.
1982).
Ohio: Secor v. Witter, 39 Ohio St. 218 (1883). But see Lanese v. Duff, 24 Ohio App. 494,
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interest in avoiding harassment and double liability, creditors in
these jurisdictions can reach neither the note nor the debt so evi-
denced. Creditors' remedies are frustrated where neither execution
nor garnishment is available.
These various statutory enactments and judicial pronounce-
ments fail to accommodate effectively the competing policies of ne-
gotiation and creditor protection. States that limit garnishment of
debts evidenced through negotiable notes to post-maturity
processes ignore the Evans dilemma created by pre-maturity
transfers unknown to the maker. States that prohibit garnishment
of persons who make or draw notes or drafts also frustrate creditor
collection efforts. Thus, although either delivery of the note to the
debtor prior to garnishment or notifying the maker of a transfer
can accommodate competing policy considerations, providing for
levy of execution by actual seizure is a preferable approach.
Levy by Seizure
The most reasonable approach to the problem of creditor pro-
cess with respect to negotiable notes is to permit seizure of the
156 N.E. 461 (1927).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. AN. tit. 12, § 1186 (1961).
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 29.185(5) (1981). See also Fishburn v. Londershausen, 50 Or.
363, 92 P. 1060 (1907).
Rhode Island: Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Clarke, 29 RI. 192, 69 A. 681 (1908).
South Dakota S.D. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 21-18-15 (1979); Antelope County State Bank of
Oakdale v. Humphrey, 57 S.D. 415, 232 N.W. 913 (1930).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-7-105 (1980).
Texas: Neal v. Kurz, 26 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Willis v. Heath, 75 Tex. 124, 12
S.W. 971 (1889). But see Inglehart v. Moore, 21 Tex. 501 (1858) (permitting garnishment of
maker once note has fallen due).
Vermont: Fuller v. Jewett, 37 Vt. 473 (1865). But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3014 (1973).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 38-7-26 (1966) (garnishment permitted only where note
returned to maker).
Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 812.19 (1977); Mason v. Noonan, 7 Wis. 510 (1859); Davis v.
Paulette, 3 Wis. 269 (1854).
Apparently, the following states have neither case law nor statutory protection for makers
of negotiable notes who are summoned as garnishees: Alabama, Alaska (maker may protect
self by paying debt into court, see ALAsKA STAT. § 09.40.040 (1973)), California, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont (but see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12
§ 3014 (1973)), and Wyoming. Many of these states, however, provide for levy by seizure of
negotiable notes. See infra note 105.
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note itself pursuant to a writ of execution. States using this ap-
proach repudiated the common law rule that notes are not subject
to levy and apply the usual creditor remedy of execution, treating
negotiable notes as tangible personal property.105 These states have
either judicial precedent holding that notes fall within the respec-
tive statutes that describe property subject to execution,10 6 or spe-
cific statutory provisions making negotiable notes "capable of man-
ual delivery. °10 7
Among the statutes governing execution, every state has one
105. California: CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 488.320 (West 1979); Jubelt v. Meyers, 84 Cal.
App. 2d 653, 191 P.2d 460 (1948); Hulman v. Crumal, 13 Cal. App. 2d 612, 57 P.2d 179
(1936).
Colorado: Union Deposit Co. v. Driscoll, 95 Colo. 140, 33 P.2d 251 (1934); Great W. Fin.
Co. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank of Denver, 76 Colo. 48, 230 P. 115 (1924) (dicta) (permitting the
sheriff to take possession of a note pursuant to garnishment in aid of execution).
District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 15-311, -312 (1981).
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-36-6 (Burns 1973).
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 626.21 (West 1950). See Brenton Bros. v. Dorr, 213 Iowa 725, 239
N.W. 808 (1931) (discussing policy and citing cases); Nordyke v. Charlton, 108 Iowa 414, 79
N.W. 136 (1899).
Louisiana: Mille's Estate v. Herbert, 19 La. Ann. 58 (1867); Miller v. Streeder, 18 La. Ann.
56 (1866). See LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. arts. 2291-2295 (West 1961).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.10 (1947); Mower v. Stickney, 5 Minn. (Gil. 321) 397
(1861).
Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-3-127, -133 (1972).
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.090(4) (Vernon 1952).
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-18-404 (1979). See State ex rel. Coffey v. District Ct. of
Fergus County, 74 Mont. 355, 240 P. 667 (1925).
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 17-58 (West 1952); N.J.R. Civ. P. 4:60-7(c).
New York: N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAw § 5201 (McKinney 1978); Anthony v. Wood, 96 N.Y. 180
(1884).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-315(5) (1969).
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 23.160 (1981); Fishburn v. Londershausen, 50 Or. 363, 92 P. 1060
(1907).
South Dakota: S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 15-18-20 (1967 & Supp. 1982).
Washington: See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 6.04.060, .100 (1963 & Supp. 1982); id. §
7.12.090 (1961); Woody's Olympia Lumber v. Roney, 9 Wash. App. 626, 513 P.2d 849 (1973);
Johnson v. Dahlquist, 130 Wash. 29, 225 P. 817 (1924); Gordon v. Hillman, 107 Wash. 490,
182 P. 574 (1919).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 38-4-6 (1966); Miller v. Cox's Adm'r., 9 W. Va. 8 (1876)
(choses in action).
Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.25 (West 1977).
106. See, e.g., Fishburn v. Londershausen, 50 Or. 363, 92 P. 1060 (1907) (negotiable notes
held to be included in statute making debtor's "property" subject to execution).
107. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 5201(c)(4) (McKinney 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
815.25 (West 1977).
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that attempts to delineate what property is subject to execution.108
These statutes usually are quite broad. For example, they provide
that "all property, real or personal," 10 9 or "goods and chattels,"11
0
or "effects" ' '1 of the debtor are subject to execution. Some state
courts hold that negotiable promissory notes fall within these stat-
utes.1 2 In these jurisdictions, the sheriff may levy upon and sell
negotiable notes to satisfy a creditor's judgment.
Although such precedents exist in only a few jurisdictions, a fair
number of states have enacted statutes that expressly make negoti-
able notes subject to execution. " These statutes typically provide
that negotiable notes are "tangible" or "capable of manual deliv-
ery.11 4 This express statutory determination is necessary to over-
come the common law rationale that notes, as choses in action, are
intangibles not subject to physical seizure or manual delivery." 5
The statutes adopted in New York" and California117 represent
a more satisfactory approach to the treatment of creditor rights
against negotiable notes, because the reasons for characterizing
notes as intangible property incapable of seizure no longer exist." 8
Negotiable instruments such as promissory notes presently are
bought, sold, and traded readily in commercial markets. Permit-
ting seizure of these notes recognizes the modern uses of commer-
cial paper. The official comments to both the New York and Cali-
fornia statutes express a clear legislative intent to change the prior
108. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-52-102 (1974 & Supp. 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 4151 (1980).
109. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-410 (Law. Co-op 1977); S.D. Coup. LAWS ANN. §
15-18-17 (1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.04.060 (1973).
110. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1503 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-1-104 (1977); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2731, 2740 (1973).
111. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3508 (1974) ("goods, chattels, rights, credits, moneys,
effects, lands and tenements" are subject to execution). See also Price v. Brady, 21 Tex. 614
(1858); Moore v. Pillow, 3 Tenn. (Hum.) 448 (1842).
112. See, e.g., Fishburn v. Londershausen, 50 Or. 363, 92 P. 1060 (1907); Mower v.
Stickney, 5 Minn. (Gil. 321) 397 (1861) (promissory note is within statute authorizing levy
on "personal property").
113. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 488.320 (West 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.10
(West 1947); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5201(c)(4) (McKinney 1978).
114. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAWS § 5201 (McKinney 1978).
115. See supra note 33.
116. See supra note 114.
117. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 488.320 (West 1979).
118. See Note, 30 MINN. L. REV. 616 (1946).
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law characterizing notes as incapable of manual delivery.119 The
California statute codifies a previously accepted rule that promis-
sory notes in a defendant's possession represent property capable
of manual delivery which may be levied upon by seizure. 120 Simi-
larly, the comments to the New York provision governing credi-
tors' collection rights explain that negotiable notes are no longer
considered intangibles.121
Besides recognizing the present nature of commercial paper,
statutes that permit seizure of negotiable notes effectively accom-
modate the competing interests involved in negotiation while pro-
viding consistency in the creditor process. Applying levy by statu-
tory seizure in the introductory hypothetical results in protecting
Maker from double liability, allowing Credit Co. access to Debtor's
assets, and providing transactional certainty for Transferee with-
out disturbing the principles of negotiability. If the sheriff is per-
mitted to seize a negotiable note held by Debtor pursuant to a writ
of execution, Maker cannot be subjected to undue harassment or
double liability, because the seizure prevents a transfer to Trans-
feree or any third party.1 22 Consequently, Transferee cannot be-
come a holder in due course and assert a claim on the note against
Maker. Furthermore, Credit Co. receives payment of its just debt
from the proceeds of the note at the execution sale. Finally, the
negotiable quality of the note is undisturbed. The unusual circum-
stances surrounding an execution sale preclude the execution
buyer of a negotiable note from taking without notice and thereby
obtaining holder in due course status (unless the prior holder was a
holder in due course).1 23 The execution buyer, however, may fur-
119. "Law Revision Commission Comment," CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 488.320, at 231-32
(West 1979); "Practice Commentaries," N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAws § 5201, at 78-79 (McKinney
1978).
120. Haulman v. Crumal, 13 Cal. App. 2d 612, 57 P.2d 179 (1936).
121. "Practice Commentaries," N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAws § 5201, at 67-69 (McKinney 1978).
122. If the transfer had occurred, the sheriff would find that the debtor was no longer in
possession of the note. If the note was the only non-exempt asset of the debtor, the sheriff
would return the writ of execution nulla bona (no assets found) or execute against the pro-
ceeds of the debtor's sale of the note. In either case, the maker is not involved. The maker
only becomes involved when the note is due, and then he is liable only to the holder.
123. See U.C.C. § 3-302(3)(a) and the Draftsmen's Comments; Finance Co. of Am. v. Wil-
son, 115 Ga. App. 280, 154 S.E.2d 459 (1967).
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ther negotiate the note,12 which may be taken by a holder in due
course.
1 25
The only fair and reasonable resolution of the problems
presented by the hypothetical is for every state to statutorily au-
thorize creditors to have a negotiable note seized pursuant to a
writ of execution, just as a television or automobile may be so
taken. The common law approach to execution of notes followed in
a majority of jurisdictions 12 prevents effective and fair debt collec-
tion by creditors. Those common law states that permit garnish-
ment of the debt evidenced by the negotiable note either expose
the makers of those notes to double liability or frustrate the expec-
tations of transferees of the notes, thereby hindering the use of
commercial paper. Moreover, common law jurisdictions that have
enacted measures to protect makers of notes from double liability
preclude all creditor process against negotiable notes because
neither execution nor garnishment is available. An addition to the
Uniform Commercial Code would provide the statutory authority
to resolve these policy conflicts while adding uniformity to the laws
of the states.
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The passage of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) in all
United States jurisdictions 2 ' had a substantial impact on credi-
tors' rights and remedies. Although the Code does not prescribe
specifically the means by which creditors may enforce money judg-
ments against their debtors, some provisions significantly affect
procedures used to help creditors realize just debts. The Code
deals expressly with creditor process of negotiable documents of
title and investment securities. 128 Anomalously, article 3, which
124. See U.C.C. § 3.301.
125. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
127. Louisiana has enacted a substantial portion of the Uniform Commercial Code, see
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 (West Supp. 1982); however, the state has not adopted the
U.C.C. as such. See State Correlation Tables volume, U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan) 191
(1979). See generally Blum, Notice to Holders in Due Course and Other Bona Fide Pur-
chasers under the U.C.C., 22 B.C.L. REv. 203 (1981); Charleton, Louisiana Civil Law Ren-
aissance: A Bar to Adoption of the U.C.C.? 18 Am. Bus. L.J. 1 (1981).
128. See U.C.C. § 7-602 (documents of title); U.C.C. § 8-317 (investment securities);
U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan) 7602, 8317 (1964). See generally Kennedy, The Rights of
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governs the negotiation of commercial paper, contains no provision
prescribing creditors' remedies against negotiable promissory notes
or negotiable instruments generally. 12 9 Absent an article 3 provi-
sion governing creditors' rights against negotiable notes, the policy
conflicts and collection dilemma previously discussed persist.
Moreover, the lack of a uniform approach to creditor process is
burdensome to businesses nationwide. 130
An analysis of the Code's approach to creditors' remedies and
negotiable property in light of commercial policy concerns suggests
the need for a new article 3 provision governing creditors' rights
against commercial paper generally and negotiable promissory
notes specifically. Two sections of the Code provide potential mod-
els for resolving the policy conflicts surrounding creditor process
against negotiable notes: section 7-602, providing for creditors'
remedies against negotiable documents of title, and section 8-317,
allowing creditors' remedies against investment securities. An ex-
amination of these sections reveals that section 8-317 provides the
preferable model for creditors' rights against negotiable promissory
notes.
Negotiable Documents of Title; Section 7-602
Article 7 of the Code governs negotiable documents of title,
which represent title to goods and are an important vehicle for
commercial activity. A party in possession of a document of title is
entitled to receive, hold, and dispose of the document and the
Levying Creditors Against Negotiable Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 31
Bus. LAw. 1517 (1976).
This Note omits a discussion of forms of negotiable commercial paper other than negotia-
ble notes. Negotiable documents of title and negotiable investment securities are negotiable
instruments within the article 3 rules; however, sections 7-602 and 8-317 preempt any new
Code provision regarding creditor's rights in those negotiable instruments. See U.C.C. §§ 3-
103(1), 8-102(1)(c). Therefore, the only form of negotiable instruments that would be cov-
ered by a new provision in article 3 that are not discussed are drafts. See supra note 4.
129. The only commentators who address this problem note the absence of such a provi-
sion in article 3 of the U.C.C. See S. RESENFELD, supra note 10, at 175 n.4; Kennedy, supra
note 128, at 1530.
130. The express purpose of the U.C.C. is to modernize, simplify, clarify, and unify com-
mercial law. U.C.C. § 1-102. The present state of creditor process against negotiable notes
requires businesses that operate nationwide to gain familiarity with the law of 51
jurisdictions.
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goods it covers."" In negotiable form, documents of title provide a
convenient means of transferring legal title to goods without actu-
ally transferring the goods.132 Section 602 of article 7 provides
creditors with remedies against negotiable documents of title. Spe-
cifically, section 7-602 states:
[N]o lien attaches by virtue of any judicial process to goods in
the possession of a bailee for which a negotiable document of
title is outstanding unless the document be first surrendered to
the bailee or its negotiation enjoined, and the bailee shall not be
compelled to deliver the goods pursuant to process until the
document is surrendered to him or impounded by the court.133
As the Draftsmen's Comment explains, the purpose of this pro-
vision is "to protect the bailee from the conflicting claims of the
document holder and the judgment creditor of the person who .de-
posited the goods."134 The bailee's dilemma addressed in section 7-
602 is analogous to Maker's potential dilemma described in the in-
troductory hypothetical. Credit Co. may garnish Maker, and
Transferee may request that she satisfy the note, thus exposing her
to possible double liability on the instrument. In section 7-602, the
Code draftsmen addressed the analogous problem with warehouse
receipts to protect the bailee from double liability on the ware-
house receipt."3 5
Although the creditors' remedies provided in section 7-602 also
might be applied to a creditor enforcing a money judgment against
a negotiable note, for a number of reasons, section 8-317 represents
a more appropriate approach to creditors' rights against commer-
cial paper. The primary reason for using section 8-317 as a model
is that seizure of negotiable notes is preferable to enjoining the ne-
gotiation, as provided in section 7-602.13" Enjoining the debtor
from transferring the note only theoretically prevents negotiation
to a third party, because injunctive relief assumes the debtor's
131. See generally Riegart, Documents of Title Under Article 7, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 105
(1980).
132. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMRS, supra note 62, § 20-4.
133. U.C.C. § 7-602 (in pertinent part).
134. U.C.C. § 7-602, Draftsmen's Comment 1. See also Kennedy, supra note 128, at 1517-
20.
135. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
136. See supra text accompanying note 133.
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compliance.13  Despite the injunction, however, a creditor may be
frustrated if a transferee, unaware of the injunction, takes the note
from the debtor in good faith and for fair consideration. In this
fashion, the transferee becomes a holder in due course and the
completed transaction is protected.138 As the decisions in
Knisely5 9 and Bricks Unlimited 40 demonstrated, this kind of
transfer may cause conflicting claims and double liability for the
maker regardless of whether the transfer violates a court order.
Thus, patterning new section 3-420 after section 7-602's injunction
provision would expose the maker to potential double liability and
possibly frustrate the creditors' collection attempts despite due
diligence.
As an alternative to an injunction, section 7-602 provides that a
creditor may procure a lien against a document of title if the docu-
ment is surrendered to the bailee.14 1 In terms of negotiable notes
and the introductory hypothetical, this procedure would be similar
to having the note returned to the maker. 142 This procedure also
would protect the maker in a manner very similar to levy by
seizure by immobilizing the instrument and preventing transfers to
third parties. Consequently, the maker, as the bailee in 7-602,
avoids conflicting claims and double liability.
Despite this protection, section 7-602 is not the model for a new
section 3-420. First, negotiable documents of title represent goods
as well as commercial paper.1 43 Furthermore, the market for docu-
ments of title is considerably smaller than that for negotiable
137. See Rendleman, supra note 22, at 357.
138. Comment 2 to § 7-602 makes clear that the drafters contemplated the situation in
which the enjoined holder violates the injunction and negotiates the instrument. In such a
situation, the innocent purchaser for value will defeat the levying creditor. Thus, this result
alone suggests an inadequacy with the remedy. creditors are frustrated in collecting just
debts even where they utilize all procedures provided to them by law.
139. 34 Ohio St. 158 (1877). See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
140. 672 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
142. Some courts have required such a return or surrender to the maker as a prerequisite
to garnishing the maker of a negotiable note. See, e.g., Huot, Kelly & Co. v. Ely, Candee &
Wilder, 17 Fla. 775 (1880); Gunn v. Manthov, 138 Wash. 96, 244 P. 133 (1926). See also W.
VA. CODE § 38-7-26 (1966). A recent commentator was unable to uncover any case law re-
ported under § 7-602. See Kennedy, supra note 128, at 1530.
143. See generally J. WHrrE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 62, at 782-98.
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notes.4 A rule governing negotiable notes must contemplate con-
sumer transactions as well as sophisticated commercial transac-
tions. Thus, patterning new section 3-420 after section 7-602 may
be unwise, especially in light of the alternative offered by section
8-317.
Certified Investment Securities: Section 8-317
Article 8 of the Code governs investment securities. Section 8-
317 sets out creditors' rights against investment securities: no at-
tachment or levy upon a certified security or any share or other
interest represented thereby which is outstanding is valid until the
security is actually seized by the officer making the attachment or
levy. 45 The Draftsmen's Comment to the text emphasizes that this
provision focuses on the instrument itself on the theory that a
valid levy cannot be made unless any possibility of the secutity
finding its way to a transferee is removed. 4" The creditor must im-
mobilize the security itself; if the security is transferred by trans-
ferring the certificate, the courts protect the completed transfer
and the transferee defeats the creditor's collection effort. 47 Al-
though section 8-317 mentions injunctive relief, 4 s the Comment
suggests that whenever the debtor possesses the security, levy by
seizure is the creditor's proper remedy.149
Like section 7-602, section 8-317 addresses the same policy con-
cerns presented in the introductory hypothetical by providing
creditors with access to the debtor's property without sacrificing
the negotiable quality of the securities.5 0 If levy against securities
144. See id. at 798-813.
145. U.C.C. § 8-317 (in pertinent part).
146. U.C.C. § 8-317, Draftsmen's Comment 1. See also Kennedy, supra note 128, at 1520-
24.
147. See U.C.C. § 8-302. See also Prisbrey v. Noble, 505 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974); In re
Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956 (Me. 1981).
148. U.C.C. § 8-317(6) provides in pertinent part: "A creditor whose debtor is the owner
of a security is entitled to aid from the courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction or
otherwise, in reaching the security . . . ." Id.
149. See U.C.C. § 8-317. See also Kennedy, supra note 128, at 1520-24.
The Code approach to investment securities is analogous to New York's and California's
approaches to creditors' rights against negotiable notes, which require seizure of the note to
perfect a levy. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. See also Mazer v. Williams Bros. Co.,
461 Pa. 587, 337 A.2d 559 (1975) (discussing similarity between policies regarding § 3-302
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were permitted through notice alone, a creditor might be defeated
if the certificate of security was transferred to a bona fide pur-
chaser. 151 Conversely, if the creditors' rights were considered para-
mount, the marketplace for securities would be undermined be-
cause parties could no longer rely on the certificates themselves.
Section 8-317 provides a useful model for drafting new section 3-
420 for several reasons. First, the similar historical treatment of
investment securities and promissory notes suggests that the law
should recognize the commercial qualities of negotiable instru-
ments in the same manner that the law has recognized corporate
securities. 5 ' Second, seizure of a negotiable instrument to perfect
one's interest in the instrument would add consistency to the
Code.15 3 Third, seizure is the traditional and usual method of exe-
cution.154 Finally, permitting levy by seizure will accommodate the
interests of the maker and the transferee while providing the credi-
tor with an effective collection procedure. 5
The common law treated both shares of corporate stock and
promissory notes as intangibles.158 Such intangible rights were per-
sonal to an individual and nontransferable.1 57 Accordingly, credi-
tors could not reach notes or shares of stock to enforce judgments,
through execution or otherwise.5 ' As shares became transferable,
they became more valuable and creditors demanded access to
them.159 In response, states developed procedures whereby credi-
tors served notice of their interests in these notes upon corpora-
tions' headquarters to gain liens against corporate securities.160
Levy thus was by notice, similar to some state approaches to levy
holders in due course and § 8-302 bona fide purchasers).
151. Even though a levying creditor may gain a lien against the security, a bona fide pur-
chaser will take the security free of the creditor's lien. See U.C.C. § 8-302(3).
152. See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
155. Id.
156. Absent a statute to the contrary, neither corporate stock nor promissory notes were
subject to levy and sae on execution. See Lowremore v. Berry, 19 Ala. 130 (1851) (promis-
sory notes); Tow v. Evans, 194 Ga. 160, 20 S.E.2d 922 (1942) (corporate stock).
157. See S. RIESENFELD, supra note 10, at 215-17.
158. See Partch v. Adams, 55 Cal. App. 2d 1, 130 P.2d 244 (1942).
159. See S. RMESENFELD, supra note 10, at 215.
160. See Loiseaux, Liability of Corporate Shares to Legal Process, 1972 DuKE L.J. 947,
949-50.
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on negotiable notes."6 ' The Uniform Stock Transfer Act' 62 (USTA)
changed the law regarding levy on corporate stock by requiring ac-
tual seizure.16 3 Finally, in adopting section 8-317, the drafters of
the Code acknowledged the changed quality of share and other in-
vestment securities, and followed the USTA approach. 6 4
Although the historical treatment of promissory notes parallels
that of investment securities, the Code and a majority of jurisdic-
tions still do not provide for the seizure of negotiable notes. 65 Va-
rious jurisdictions continue to treat negotiable notes as "choses in
action"'6 6  and "intangibles,' 6 7 thereby exposing creditors and
notemakers to the uncertainty suggested in the introductory hypo-
thetical. Because of the present negotiable quality of promissory
notes and other forms of commercial paper, the Code should pro-
vide and states should adopt a creditor collection process for nego-
tiable notes similar to that existing for investment securities. A
new section 3-420 based on the principles of current section 8-317
would constitute the most reasonable approach.
Proposed Section 3-420
A committee currently is examining and suggesting revisions to
articles 3, 4, and 8 of the Code. 6 8 This Note proposes that the
committee consider drafting a new section in article 3 that would
provide specifically for creditors' rights against negotiable notes
and other forms of commercial paper. Modeled after section 8-317,
a new section 3-4201e9 would permit creditors to seize negotiable
instruments and other forms of commercial paper through an ap-
161. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
162. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act was enacted originally by all jurisdictions in the
United States and later incorporated substantially in article 8 of the U.C.C. See J. WrTE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 62, at 2-4.
163. Uniform Stock Transfer Act §4 13, 14.
164. See U.C.C. § 8-317 and Draftsmen's Comment; U.C.C. REP. SERv. (Callaghan) T 8317
(1964).
165. See supra notes 31-126 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Maricopa County v. Arizona Lodge, 52 Ariz. 329, 80 P.2d 955 (1938).
167. See, e.g., Harris v. Smith, 150 Fla. 125, 7 So. 2d 343 (1942).
168. The committee is chaired by Robert Haydock, Jr. and is commonly called the
"3-4-8" or "348" Committee.
169. Considering the present structure of article 3, the logical place for a creditor's rights
provision is after § 3-419, because the 400 series of article 3 governs the rights of parties to
commercial paper.
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propriate officer of the court. As with section 8-317, seizure of the
negotiable instrument would resolve the policy conflicts presented
in the introductory hypothetical, because Debtor could not trans-
fer a note to Transferee that had been seized by the sheriff pursu-
ant to execution process.170
Besides recognrzing current commercial realities surrounding the
use of negotiable notes, a new section 3-420 would add internal
consistency to the Code. First, such a provision would eliminate
the incongruity of providing creditors rights against all other forms
of negotiable property without recogmzing creditors' rights in arti-
cle 3.171 Additionally, the concept of requiring seizure of a negotia-
ble note to perfect one's interest in that note presently exists in
the Code: pursuant to section 9-305, a creditor perfects a security
interest in a negotiable note by taking possession of it.1" 2 Thus,
allowing a creditor attempting to enforce a money judgment to
perfect rights in a negotiable note by having the sheriff seize it is
not an unprecedented addition to the Code, but rather a step to-
ward consistency.
Moreover, the drafting and enactment of a new section 3-420
would help harmonize divergent state approaches to this important
issue. The new provision would permit creditors to utilize the ordi-
nary procedures for enforcing judgments, thereby simplifying and
unifying state collection practices. Creditors could reach negotiable
notes just as they would reach other tangible personal property of
the debtor - through execution. In those states presently permit-
ting levy on notes by seizure, 3 such a new provision would cause
little, if any, disruption in existing Code or collection procedures.
In the majority of states Which follow the common law, new section
3-420 would help remove anachronistic notions concerning notes as
intangibles while promoting commercial confidence in promissory
170. When a sheriff seizes a note pursuant to a writ of execution, an innocent transferee
or holder in due course is precluded from receiving the note. Thus, the maker is not exposed
to claims by both a holder m due course and a garnishing creditor.
171. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
172. U.C.C. § 9-305 provides in pertinent part- "A security interest in letters of credit
goods, instruments, negotiable documents or chattel paper may be perfected by the secured
party's taking possession of the collateral." Id. See In re Bruce Farley Corp., 612 F.2d 1197
(9th Cir. 1980); In re Staff Mortgage & Investment Corp., 550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1977);
Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Shuster, 307 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1981).
173. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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notes and simplifying collection procedures.
Finally, a new section 3-420, modeled after section 8-317, would
resolve satisfactorily the competing needs and interests of the vari-
ous parties identified in the introductory hypothetical. Like levy
by seizure statutes and section 8-317 procedures, new section 3-420
would accommodate each of the parties' interests while preserving
note negotiability. Credit Co. may have the note owing to Debtor
seized. This permits Credit Co. to collect its just debts. Conse-
quently, Maker is neither unduly harassed by an action between
Credit Co. and Debtor nor called upon to pay the note more than
once. Moreover, Transferee's interest in preserving undisturbed
any note transaction is protected because he would never gain pos-
session of the note.
A new section 3-420 levy by seizure statute is not rendered im-
practical if the note is, in fact, negotiated to Transferee. Assuming
that Transferee takes for value, in good faith, and without notice
of any deficiencies in the note, Transferee attains holder in due
course status and may defeat any other claims to the instru-
ment.174 Thus, negotiability is preserved. Additionally, Maker may
not be subjected to double liability because Debtor cannot obtain
possession of the note; the sheriff's attempted seizure of the note
would be frustrated and the writ of execution would be returned
nuila bona.175 Thereafter, Credit Co. must seek enforcement of its
money judgment by other means. 17 6 Thus, new section 3-420 ac-
commodates the policies of satisfying creditors, protecting third
parties from harassment, and assuring the negotiable quality of
promissory notes.
CONCLUSION
The desire to clarify and modernize commercial law while
promulgating uniform national rules played an important role in
174. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
175. "The name of the return by the sheriff to a writ of execution, when he has not found
any goods of the defendant within his jurisdiction on which he could levy." BLACK'S LAW
DIcToNARY 962 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
176. If execution and garnishment procedures prove unsatisfactory, the creditor should
examine the particular state statutes to determine what supplemental proceedings are avail-
able. For a discussion of when a creditor should resort to supplemental proceedings, see
supra note 22.
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the drafting and adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.1 "
The law governing creditor process of negotiable notes is neither
simple, clear, modern, nor uniform. Many states cling to anachro-
nistic notions of notes as "intangibles" and "choses in action."
Other jurisdictions struggle with conflicting court rules attempting
to satisfy the competing interests and policies involved. Finally, al-
though the Code attempts to modernize and unify the law, a con-
spicuous absence exists in article 3 regarding creditors' rights
against commercial paper. This confusion, inadequacy, and incon-
sistency may be resolved by adopting a new section 3-420 that pro-
vides authority for a sheriff to levy upon hegotiable notes and
other forms of commercial paper by actual seizure.
BRUCE H. MATSON
. 177. See U.C.C. § 1-102 and Draftsmen's Comment 1.
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